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Abstract 
Research use of sensitive information – personally identifiable information (PII), 
protected health information (PHI), commercial or proprietary data, and the like – is increasing 
as researchers’ skill with “big data” matures. Duke University’s Protected Network is an 
environment with technical controls in place that provide research groups with essential 
pieces of security measures needed for studies using sensitive information. The environment 
uses virtualization and authorization groups extensively to isolate data, provide elasticity of 
resources, and flexibly meet a range of computational requirements within tightly controlled 
network boundaries. Since its beginning in 2011, the environment has supported about 200 
research projects and groups and has served as a foundation for specialized and protected IT 
infrastructures in the social sciences, population studies, and medical research. This article 
lays out key features of the development of the Protected Network and outlines the IT 
infrastructure design and organizational features that Duke has used in establishing this 
resource for researchers. It consists of four sections: 1. Context, 2. Infrastructure, 3. 
Authentication and identity management, and 4. The infrastructure as a “platform.” 
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1. Context. 
1.1. Increasing need for well controlled and closely monitored computing environments 
Trends in data-rich scholarship, the ubiquity of useful data, and heightened risk of 
disclosure both to individuals and to institutions have combined to make data protection more 
of a focus for shared, centralized IT infrastructure and less a decentralized “problem” for 
researchers and departments to handle independently. The sheer volume of data generated 
and stored presents its own data management challenges. In a 2014 report sponsored by 
storage provider EMC, IDC estimated worldwide “digital universe” data sizes would double 
every two years and amount to around 44 zettabytes (44 trillion gigabytes) in 2020. Of the 
data assessed in 2013 by IDC, about 43% required some measure of protection because of 
sensitivity (e.g., corporate financial information, PII, user account information). Of that 
sensitive data, only 48% was stored in environments that provided data protection 
commensurate with the need (IDC 2014). Although data held at academic research 
institutions accounts for a fraction of the total “digital universe,” the challenges they pose are 
still significant. At Duke, centrally managed data doubles every three years. In 2016, Duke’s 
Office of Information Technology managed a total of eight petabytes of data storage, about a 
quarter of which was used in grant-supported and intramural research; and it should be noted 
that these data do not include clinical and medical data managed by the Duke Health System. 
While universities share characteristics of the great “digital universe,” their institutional 
and network circumstances stand in contrast to the more tightly controlled networks of 
commercial and business entities – which are of course the IDC report’s primary focus. 
University networks have traditionally been more open and accessible, in part because of 
history and in part reflecting universities’ commitment to “open science” and freedom of 
academic exchange. That stance complicates implementation of data protection measures, 
many of which amount to access restrictions placed on data. And yet, campus 
implementations also must take into account the tradition of free exchange of scholarly 
information that is a hallmark of university life and academic research. 
Tensions arising from the press of increasing data, much of which requires vigilance, 
and the established mores and practices of academic institutions make up the pragmatic 
context for the Duke Protected Network. The infrastructure was created to navigate and, as 
much as possible, resolve these tensions while providing state of the art computational 
options for campus researchers. 
1.2. Data classification and security 
Data classification often is the starting point for decision-making about data management 
and, for that matter, about much of the overall data security endeavor, since it frames ways to 
describe data assets and controls and underlies decisions of access control (see Alberts & 
Dorofee 2002, Saint-Germaine 2005). Solidifying classification was a prerequisite for 
designing the Protected Network infrastructure and its features have been derived from risk 
mitigation and protections that sensitive data require in particular. 
The Duke Information Technology Security Office (ITSO) and the Information Security 
Office (ISO) of the Duke Health System established a three-category data classification 
standard and defined characteristics of access to data of all types after conducting data risk 
assessments across campus. The three categories – “Sensitive,” “Restricted,” and “Public” – 
correspond to risk levels, with “public” bearing the lowest risk for data approved for release to 
the general public and “sensitive” being “most restrictive data classification category [...] 
reserved for data that Duke is either required by law to protect, or which Duke protects to 
mitigate institutional risk.” Under the standard, access to sensitive data is explicitly granted to 
individuals, while access to “restricted” data is “determined by business process needs” (Duke 
ITSO 2014) which is, essentially, a role-based framework. The simple three-category 
approach meets the needs of the Duke enterprise, including research. 
Data classified as “sensitive” of course presents researchers and the institution with their 
biggest management challenges. This classification includes information such as Social 
Security Numbers, credit card information, PHI, FERPA-protected (i.e., non-directory) data, as 
well as institutional data of special sensitivity and research data which Duke is contractually 
bound to protect in specific ways. Controls required for these data – in some cases mandated 
in government regulations – underlie requirements for technical controls present in the 
Protected Network, though it is good to note that implemented technical controls do not in 
themselves meet all requirements. The Protected Network standardizes technical controls 
and allows administrators, staff, and research scholars to build secure processes upon a 
common foundation of well supported IT infrastructure and administrative process. 
1.3. Real partnership: IT security, IT support, research groups 
The institution determined that organizing security controls around data classification 
was an efficient approach that would enable Duke to meet regulatory and other third party 
requirements most effectively, and proceeded down that route when the OIT Protected 
Network project was started in 2011. The data classification scheme forms the basis of the 
infrastructure, and allows the institution to concentrate security efforts on data that present 
high risk to the institution, thus simplifying compliance with regulations and data use 
agreements and allowing researchers engaged with sensitive data more freedom to conduct 
research. The last point – “freedom to conduct research” – is not an insubstantial or incidental 
outcome, but is baked into the rationale and the execution of the infrastructure. Indeed, 
without that point, the essential partnership of researchers, IT, and information security staff 
would be difficult to forge.  
Building partnerships in academe isn’t for the faint-of-heart, since the ethos of such 
institutions favors decentralization and researcher autonomy – which make well structured 
security measures difficult to establish, much less to enforce. Corporate IT models are often 
seen as too “buttoned down” to be responsive to academic research processes. And yet, as 
Johnston & Warkentin (2010) observe, “end users are not consistent in their behavioral 
intentions to comply with recommendations to protect their informational assets. As a result, 
decentralized IT governance environments, which place a significant portion of decision-
making and system management in the hands of the end user, may exhibit a significant[ly] 
increased vulnerability profile” (see also Warkentin & Willison 2009). That is to say, 
decentralized IT imparts a higher level of institutional risk, if for no other reason than 
increasing the variability of IT installations and increasing the likelihood of ineptly 
implemented security standards. Discovering disclosures in a decentralized environment also 
is problematic. 
The organizational and community framework for the Protected Network is an essential 
component of the entire security “apparatus” – and one frequently missed by institutions that 
think of data protection as a technical problem (Biever & DeLong 2015). Not only is initial 
assent and willingness required from researchers, research administrators, security 
professionals, and IT staff, but a communication mechanism for ongoing involvements and 
interactions is necessary. At Duke, research group manager meetings take place on a bi-
monthly schedule. These are attended by IT and data security staff from departments, centers, 
and schools whose researchers use the Protected Network and university leaders in 
information security and research computing. The group discusses use cases, tool and 
resource development, changes to systems and processes, and generally consults on 
matters relating to use of sensitive data in research and ways to engineer scalable and 
flexible responses to researchers’ computing needs for data-sensitive work. 
2. Infrastructure. 
2.1. Air-gaps and “little boxes” v. structured network traffic and virtualized environments 
Strategies for isolating sensitive data reflect tools that are available at the time when 
protection of data “becomes a problem,” and in many cases technological inertia or regulation 
have frozen methods of data protection in place. For example, some data agreements still 
require an “air gap” between computers holding data and other networks in addition to other 
physical security requirements and modes of data transport. The strategy, of course, can 
work quite well to protect data, though certainly not perfectly (as a caution, see Falliere, 
Murchu & Chien 2011; Guri, Monitz & Elovici 2016, among others), by making security 
measures more physically apparent and usually requiring physical access or proximity to 
accommodate restrictions. Unfortunately, “air gap” systems also constrain research to 
methods that can be executed on hardware that happens to be in place. Given the quick 
progress in technological development, today’s amply outfitted hardware quickly becomes 
tomorrow’s woeful “little box.” The term “air gap” itself has acquired a bit of a metaphorical 
hue as well, since some companies claim “that a network or system is sufficiently air-gapped 
even if it is only separated from other computers or networks by a software firewall” (Zetter 
2014). 
In part to avoid the inevitable constraint of “little boxes,” the design of the Protected 
Network aggressively uses virtualization of IT resources to make the environment suitable for 
– and scalable to – the diversity of research projects that are conducted within it. Projects 
require tailored computational tools depending on the software that is needed, the size of 
datasets, the computational power that is required to execute analysis, and interfaces or 
operating systems that are familiar for researchers (or required by software tools). In addition, 
virtualization allows changes over the course of a project, so that IT infrastructure can align 
with changing – and often intensifying – computational needs. Thus, this fundamental 
virtualization strategy for provisioning resources increases the efficiency of research by 
allowing for dynamic sizing and resizing of resources in accord with computational demands. 
Indeed, whole computational setups can be tested and, as the case may be, abandoned and 
reconfigured without regard for hardware limitations and encumbered capital expenses that 
are part of often sizable equipment purchases. 
2.2. Partitioning of resources in the Protected Network 
The partitioning of basic IT resources is accomplished through use of hypervisors for 
supplying compute cycles (2.2.1), segmentation of storage (2.2.2), network isolation and 
segmentation through virtualization techniques and software-defined networking (2.2.3), as 
well as use of applications that handle user and group authorization appropriately (2.2.4). We 
have also explored the use of separate cloud infrastructure to see how cloud resources can 
be integrated into the Protected Network environment, preserving the partitioning while also 
being tightly knit into the on-premise infrastructure (2.2.5). 
2.2.1. Hypervisor for flexible compute. Currently, virtual machines (VM) are created 
using VMware ESX as the hypervisor, and that hypervisor is extensively used through all of 
the Duke Research Computing infrastructure, including the high-throughput and high-
performance clusters and other on-demand scientific computing services. The homogeneity of 
the virtualization framework greatly reduces the balkanization of computing resources, making 
deployment of cluster computing systems (for example) within the Protected Network simpler 
and allowing for the temporary staging of machines and quick changes of RAM and CPU-core 
configurations. In effect, Protected Network resources can be scaled because a large and 
malleable computational resource underlies it, in the manner of “cloud”-like raw materials of 
compute cycles and storage. Virtual machines have the advantage of easily being destroyed 
and reconstituted, which adds flexibility and tightens economy of use while also helping to 
secure data. Destroying a VM in effect destroys data that may have been left in some state on 
a physical machine. 
Systems provisioned in the Protected Network may share a hypervisor with a VM that is 
outside of the Protected Network, though whole physical machines can also be dedicated for 
the Protected Network with the effect that VMs are isolated from other, unprotected, networks 
at the hypervisor host level (see Riddle & Chung [2015] for a survey of hypervisor security in 
cloud environments). The current infrastructure uses VMware ESX 
(https://www.vmware.com/products/esxi-and-esx.html) as the hypervisor, though other 
hypervisors, such as KVM, Xen, or Hyper-V can be used. Services devised at Duke for 
orchestration and deployment of virtual machines are not tied to any specific hypervisor 
product. 
2.2.2. Segmentation of storage capacity. Although concerns of data disclosure certainly 
are evident in the configuration and maintenance of VMs, persistent storage of sensitive data 
on data storage equipment and restrictions on their access figure prominently into the design 
of the infrastructure. Encryption of data-at-rest is possible as an option, though we do not 
consider encryption of data-at-rest as a particularly effective tool for data protection on its own. 
Storage resources are logically isolated using network controls and access control lists 
(ACLs). Network attached storage uses only CIFS protocol, and storage devices for the 
Protected Network in general house data for several logically separated projects. 
Circumstances of one project required use of iSCSI, and isolation of the data in that case was 
accomplished by dedicating physical hardware within the Protected Network solely to that 
project, a circumstance that limited the ability of the project to have storage resources resized 
according to needs. Storage was exported to the project’s virtual machine in the Protected 
Network. As a rule, NFS is not acceptable in the Protected Network. 
 
Figure 1: Virtual Private network (VPN) access. The Protected Network has two VPN contexts that constrict 
access to any of the networked machines, with pathways designed for the Protected network displayed with 
BLACK arrows. Access, once achieved, is further narrowed with ACLs that are specific to individual hosts, with 
access granted to group members. That is, within the enclave, hosts and storage are additionally restricted. 
Some parts of the Protected Network further segment access by limiting privileges once users gain access; this 
is done by limiting VPN access and supplying a limited version of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). 
 2.2.3. Network partitioning and host isolation. Data storage and computational cycles are, 
of course, endpoints that provide some sort of service; the essential element that makes 
these services consumable is access, which is fashioned by the connections and the rules 
governing them. This structure of connections is the key element that distinguishes the 
Protected Network and is critically important to creating an environment appropriate for use of 
sensitive data. 
The Protected Network concentrates access through monitored gateways, currently VPN, 
RDP, and, in some cases, SSH. User access directly to hosts or storage in the environment is 
forbidden by firewall rule and network design, and the Protected Network has a designated 
VPN context separate from all others at the University (Figure 1). The Social Science 
Research Institute (SSRI) has a separate VPN context that admits users to a subset of the 
overall Protected Network (described in section 4.1). 
Duke’s MPLS-enabled networking infrastructure allows for the creation of “virtual routing 
and forwarding” (VRF). The Protected Network is set up as a VRF designed 1) to limit 
inbound access to hosts residing in the Protected Network by constraining access from 
outside through certain closely monitored gateways and 2) to establish a network that 
functions with minimal network connections, outbound and inbound, with close monitoring for 
“housekeeping” services that do traverse the VRF boundary. 
As with the use of a hypervisor for supplying computational capacity, the use of the VRF 
technology allows flexibility in network configuration. That flexibility of network deployment 
means that widely separated machines, physically located remote from other protected 
machines, can be networked in virtual manner so that they reside “close together” (vis-à-vis 
the network) in a subnet and within the network configuration that the Protected Network VRF 
enforces. VRF technology underpins some of the innovation of a protected research 
environment currently being designed by Duke University and Duke Health System 
(described in section 4.3). 
Virtual routing and forwarding features are also represented in Software-Defined 
Networking (SDN), though with a dramatically different network infrastructure that 
disassociates network control from the switching equipment, in effect turning network control 
into a software concern and simplifying centralized network management (Kim & Feamster 
2013; Kreutz et al. 2015). Duke’s SDN installation supports an extensive “Science DMZ” that 
began with work done on grants from the National Science Foundation. Work most recently 
done with SDN has moved the Science DMZ to a multi-institutional scope, linking SDN 
networks and using research and education networks regionally and even internationally, 
using a research and education network to reach South America. 
The Science DMZ seeks to address the problem of data mobility, especially as it relates 
to Big Data science and high-performance computing installations. However, the use of SDN 
in the context of sensitive data has to do with the transfer of typically large data over 
privileged and isolated routes and, conceivably, the incorporation of well managed devices 
into the Protected Network – as may be desirable for special computing equipment or data-
producing devices that typically reside in scientific labs or shared resources. 
In three NSF-supported projects (ACI-1246042; CNS-1243315; ACI-1440588), work was 
done on an interface for secure control of SDN networking in a web-based application called 
“Switchboard” (McCahill 2015a). Switchboard, as its name implies, is a human interface that 
connects endpoints via an SDN-controlled route; people who are authorized to control the 
endpoints use Switchboard to initiate the SDN connection. Switchboard creates the rules 
inserted into an SDN controller (Ryu; https://osrg.github.io/ryu/) and maintains the state of the 
ruleset. Switchboard has been developed so that it can serve as a means to span controls 
over SDN networks in the manner of an SDN exchange (SDX), and an SDN exchange has 
been experimentally established in the Research Triangle (NC) region. 
The ability of SDN to carve out routes that link endpoints and allow for routing that 
bypasses middleboxes and firewalls that impede traffic flows has obvious benefits for 
transport of large data, though with the caveat that security protection afforded by firewalls 
and IPS devices is skirted. Switchboard, however, imparts a measure of protection by 
requiring particular and specific authorization of use of endpoints by people who are 
responsible for the endpoints. Encryption of data over the route would, of course, be done. 
Another NSF “CICI” grant (ACI-1642140) currently led by Jeffrey Chase (Department of 
Computer Science) is devising means to increase security of high-speed networks without 
taxing performance typical of traditional traffic inspections common in “regular” campus 
networks. The system uses Bro (bro.org; Paxson 1999) and also integrates a system to allow 
logical analysis of trust for authorization (Thummala & Chase 2015). 
2.2.4. Partitioning application “services.” The overall framework of the Protected Network 
can incorporate any information technology or service that can be reliably segmented so that 
users can consume data and computational resources in a manner that prevents interactions 
between projects or among users who are not authorized to use a project’s resources. This 
includes applications, such as Gitlab which has been installed within the Protected Network 
for use by members of different sensitive projects. Users’ storage and environments are 
isolated at the project level. In cases where applications do not have access controls to 
provide users or groups individually isolated workspaces, applications can be installed for 
specific groups on a group’s individual host. This, of course, complicates management of 
machines and software but also gives researchers more options for software environments 
required for their projects. 
Systems administration tools that reside outside of the confines of the Protected Network 
such as patching systems, vetted software repositories, and monitoring systems are available 
by special firewall exception or by proxy services. Of course, access to outside resources is 
allowed for certain well documented administrative functions executed by IT staff (e.g., 
system updates and monitoring). Squid (http://www.squid-cache.org/; Wessels and Claffy 
1997) has been set up to provide for some of these, and the University ITSO will consider 
research project uses of the proxy services under certain circumstances, such as scheduled 
data downloads from a data provider. Squid allows the ITSO to narrow the source of web-
based data downloads quite precisely. 
2.2.5. Integration of cloud resources. Although, at present, active projects supported by 
the Protected Network all consume local infrastructure, we have tested integration of cloud-
based infrastructure as a means of expanding services without undermining the protections 
for the computing environments – long a priority for cloud vendors such as Amazon Web 
Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure and scrutinized by the research community (see, for 
illustration, Amazon Web Services 2017a & 2017b; Ayad, Rodriguez, & Squire 2012; Nellore, 
et al. 2016; Zhang, Cheng, & Boutaba 2010). In 2016, we used Amazon Web Services to 
build a “virtual private cloud” (VPC) extension of the Duke network, linking AWS to a specific 
subnet within the Duke Protected Network.  We were able to fully incorporate our centralized 
authentication (Shibboleth) and authorization (Grouper) mechanisms into the AWS 
Management Console and to successfully test basic provisioning of S3 and EC2 instances.  
Additionally, we were able to demonstrate that similar Shibboleth and Grouper integrations 
work as advertised for command-line (CLI) interactions with specific instances via the 
published API.  Work still to be done includes (1) investigating AWS services such as 
CloudTrail and CloudWatch to allow events notifications from EC2 instances to be 
incorporated into OIT's current systems information and event management environment, (2) 
investigating AWS services such as Trusted Advisor and AWS Config to allow for more 
comprehensive visibility into performance, reliability, cost efficiency, and security compliance 
for AWS-in-Protected Network VM instances, (3) addressing issues of scalability (including 
adding a second, mirrored VPC tunnel) since there may be AWS-imposed constraints on 
Virtual Private Cloud network, or other technical constraints to complicate broad deployments, 
and (4) mapping out and implementing a strategy for managing a portal (complete with billing 
management that allows a functional, secure, auditable, and manageable deployment across 
a broad and diverse campus community) that can also integrate well with automated 
provisioning mechanisms currently deployed at Duke. 
Special services from cloud vendors, such as Amazon’s “GovCloud,” are designed to 
meet specific security and regulatory requirements for data and computing. These services 
make it possible to use cloud services infrastructure to comply, in part, with regulations as 
stringent as ITAR, FIPS 140-2, FISMA, PCI DSS Level 1, and the like. 
3. Authentication and Identity Management 
While the Protected Network as a whole comprises a group of machines, in effect this 
grouping is an administrative convenience, since access to individual machines and 
resources resolves in a more constrained fashion. That is, access within the Protected 
Network is granted to individual machines and individual data sets relating to a project – in 
effect further isolating project resources within the Protected Network – while the larger 
Protected Network provides a perimeter and a single, well monitored point-of-entry into the 
protected environment. That additional isolation is accomplished by using access control lists 
(ACLs). 
3.1. Use of centralized authentication but “local” control of access provisioning. 
Access to the environment leverages centralized identities (“NetIDs”), and all access 
requires multi-factor authentication (MFA) via Duo (Internet2; duo.com) or Yubikey tokens 
(https://yubico.com). Access and authorization, using InCommon mechanisms offered by 
Duke’s Office of Information Technology, are managed by researchers or by their data 
security staff, in effect establishing a shared security model with many responsibilities 
assumed by those “close to the scholarship.” Typically, PIs or their designees (defined as 
“Data Stewards” in the Data Classification Standard) grant or revoke access to data and 
computational resources, following data use agreements and IRB requirements. These 
individuals manage access by Grouper group (http://www.internet2.edu/products-
services/trust-identity/grouper/) membership of users whose passwords are authenticated via 
Kerberos within Duke’s Active Directory environment. 
In the case of an area of the Protected Network managed and maintained by Duke’s 
Social Science Research Institute (SSRI), Grouper is further used to classify users by 
approved method of access and thereby grant more finely defined privileges for their use of 
the environment. Guidelines from SSRI data security staff help with compliance and take 
some administrative burden from researchers (see section 4.1).  
3.2. Accommodation of external collaborators. 
Since research often involves collaborators from institutions other than Duke, access 
provisioning is done with two methods: use of federated authentication (available by 
arrangement with other InCommon institutions) or provisioning of a Duke “NetID” as an 
affiliate, a process that qualifies access through a Duke-based sponsor who bears 
responsibility for accuracy of the record and maintaining currency of active collaborators as 
well as complying with appropriate approval processes. With support from the National 
Science Foundation (ACI-1440588), Duke OIT and campus researchers greatly expanded the 
scope of web-based federated authentication using the well established Shibboleth tools 
(Internet2, Carter 2015). Essentially, Duke developers subjected entire operating systems – 
Windows and Linux – to Shibboleth authentication in web browsers, making any Windows- or 
Linux-platform application into a tool accessible and usable within a web browser. Previous to 
this development, web “domesticated” applications were web-based by design (e.g., R-Studio 
or Wordpress). With the work accomplished during the grant, any Windows- or Linux-based 
application (e.g., Microsoft Office or Matlab) can be used on a machine accessible by 
Shibboleth and presented within a web browser. 
3.2.1. “Domestication” of operating system platforms and applying web-based federated 
authentication tools. The federation work done in the NSF-sponsored project in part was an 
example of “domestication” – or “the process of externalizing authentication, authorization and 
group management from applications.”1 The project’s focus on domesticating whole operating 
                                                
1 A fuller description from SURFnet is useful: “Domestication is described as the process 
of externalizing authentication, authorization and group management from applications. 
Domesticated application[s] typically use a[n] external authentication source like for example 
system platforms, however, dramatically extended the range of software available “on the 
web” via a simple modern web-browser. Mark McCahill and Robert Carter did the bulk of the 
work, with McCahill (2015b) focusing on Linux and Carter (2015) on Windows in a system 
called “Proconsul.” An open-source project from the Apache Foundation, called “Guacamole,” 
is currently “incubating” and was considered for adoption for the project 
(https://guacamole.incubator.apache.org/). McCahill’s and Carter’s systems essentially “glue” 
various already available applications and services, such as xVNC, authentication 
mechanisms (both Duke’s centralized systems and those local to machines), Docker (for 
Linux), and virtual machine orchestration mechanisms. Both the Linux and Windows systems 
“map” users to virtual machines or to container instances, so there is a level of abstraction 
separating a user’s identity in Duke’s IdM system (i.e., the “NetID” of a “Real Persistent User”) 
and the arbitrarily created “user” of a Linux or Windows instance. Because these accounts are 
unified in a database, users’ activities on VMs, of course, can still be traced to individuals. 
The entire set up “externalizes” the authentication mechanism from the operating system 
to the web, allowing for use of Shibboleth, which of course is web-based authentication that 
also supports multi-factor authentication. Successful “Shib” authentication links the 
authenticated Real Persistent User to an arbitrary user on the virtual machine. The linkage is 
recorded in a database, so that sessions can be reinitiated in a preserved state and retained 
for the record. In order to maintain a continuity of a user’s access to network attached storage 
(such as a mapped “Windows Network Share”), some associations of network storage 
controlled by the Real Persistent User and the arbitrary user (and that user’s short-lived 
credentials) are also created on-the-fly. 
The association of a Real Persistent User and the arbitrary user is, thus, maintained by 
the system, but with clear distinctions that make the system work seamlessly and also provide 
security benefit: the Real Persistent User’s identity and credentials are never available to the 
VM; likewise the arbitrary user’s “identity” and credentials on a Windows or Linux VM are 
                                                                                                                                                                 
a SAML based identity federation, and communicate with group management and 
authorization systems to retrieve additional information on the authenticated user, his/her 
roles and rights…. Domesticated applications enable single sign-on features for users, as well 
as the ability to share group context between multiple applications. From the service provider 
point of view, externalizing identity and group management eases the burden of maintaining 
these kind[s] of account data.” Cited in DeLong, 2016, at reference: 
https://wiki.surfnet.nl/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=3571713 (Accessed Feb 16, 2016; but 
on Apr 26, 2017, “not found”). 
never revealed to the Real Persistent User, either. Moreover, the VM’s arbitrary user’s 
credentials (in the Duke implementation at least) are ephemeral, lasting only for a single 
session before being destroyed. 
The distinction of Real Persistent User and the arbitrary user on the virtual machine 
allows for greater control of access, since normal (and typically long-lived) permissions of the 
Real Persistent User can be completely changed and shaped by the permission granted to 
the arbitrary user for a specific session on a VM. In Proconsul, the orchestration mechanism 
for Windows machines, this distinction of Real and arbitrary users brings both complication 
and security benefit. The abstraction layer between the authentication systems (web-based 
Shibboleth and the local Windows OS) complicates mappings of the Real Persistent User’s 
home directory provided by the University, because within the context of the Windows VM the 
Real Persistent User’s identity is re-represented by an ephemeral arbitrary user without the 
privileges that the Real Persistent User enjoys. That is, from the vantage point of the 
university’s centralized storage system, the Real and the arbitrary users are actually 
completely different, with the result that file and directory access does not align for them. This 
disparity of user identity is managed in Proconsul by manipulating group membership; 
Proconsul adds the arbitrary user of the virtual Windows machine to the same group as the 
Real Persistent User. Access is thus managed at the group level, where the Real and 
arbitrary user permissions can be brought into alignment. See Figure 2 for a visual 
representation of the Proconsul system. 
But the arbitrary user can be assigned completely different privileges than the ones 
granted to the Real Persistent User, and that realignment of privileges can have great security 
benefit because the privileges are short-lived. This means, in effect, that permissions can be 
crafted (for example) to permit certain data accesses only via a VM provided through the 
Proconsul system, narrowing Real Persistent User’s options and permissions to a very 
specific machine set up under very specific and temporary circumstances. A concrete 
example of the benefit exploits Proconsul’s abstraction layer between Real and arbitrary 
users as well as the mediating abstraction layer separating the web and Windows VM. Duke’s 
Office of Information Technology uses Proconsul’s abstractions of authentication and user 
identities to limit the exposure of privileged user credentials to the Windows OS (which is 
targeted by Pass-the-Hash exploits) and by doing so limits the “kill-chain” of compromises of 
Active Directory services (Hummel & Niem 2009; Oberle, et al. 2016). 
The developer, Robert Carter, called an early version of the Proconsul system 
“Schaufenstern” for good reason: the system separates the “outside” from the “inside” by a 
“pane of glass,” metaphorically speaking, through which you can see but which also prevents 
direct interaction. (Schaufenstern is German for display windows or shop windows.) That 
separation has security benefit, for by separating the mechanisms of authentication and 
coordinating them by other back-end means, computers can be shielded from exploits like 
“Pass-the-Hash” which exploit the persistence and transmission of credentials in networked 
Windows systems (Hummel 2009). Although a Pass-the-Hash attack cannot be entirely 
prevented, the temporary nature of the Windows credentials in the system severely limits the 
timeframe for an attack. For all practical purposes, the timeframe is a single user session. 
The technology also has some advantages in reducing the risk of connections from 
“unmanaged” devices – i.e., computers not managed by IT staff to a set of standards or 
policies, and which are therefore more prone to compromise. The benefit comes from the 
“pane-of-glass” separation from the target VM located within the Protected Network. Moreover, 
the Linux or Windows desktops of the virtual machines are presented in a modern web 
browser, providing the added benefit that no client-side software, like VNC or “Remote 
Desktop” is required. Restrictions of “copy-n-paste” features are also possible by disabling 
them in JavaScript. Full use of web-browser-based access to the Protected Network has not 
yet been implemented. 
  
Figure 2: The integrated system. In order to provide a protected area for development of the system, all 
components are encapsulated in the Duke Protected Network / PRDN (BLUE box). In other environments 
where synthetic data is able to be made public without disclosure concerns, such a complete isolation 
would not be required. The original sensitive data is protected (RED box), and those data would always 
be tightly controlled. In the case of the DIBBs grant, this network area contained the OPM data and was 
not accessible by individuals who were granted access only to the synthetic data. Synthetic data modeled 
from the original data (ORANGE box) allows access in a less restricted fashion than is the case for the 
original data. Since the synthetic data resembles the original data in structure and general characteristics, 
analysis conducted with it can be useful and meaningful. Results from analysis of synthetic data can be 
compared with identical analysis conducted on the original data set (“verification service,” PURPLE 
hexagon). The service has access to both the highly protected original data and is accessible by 
individuals with access only to the synthetic data. 
 
Figure 2: "Proconsul" infrastructure for web-browser-based Windows. From a user’s perspective, the 
process of accessing a “domesticated” Windows VM is: 1) A user from University A points her web browser 
(at the bottom the figure) at a page to gain access to a Windows VM offered by University B. 2) University B 
determines whether the user qualifies for access by seeing whether University B counts her as OK, either 
by consulting internal records or rules and asking University A to confirm the user’s credentials (“authN, 
authZ request”). 3) University B maps the user to a temporary username on a virtual machine and passes 
the desktop of that machine through a system using RDP and VNC to render the desktop to the user in a 
web browser. The user’s claim on the virtual machine will persist, but the credentials for access to the virtual 
machine is unknown to the user. 4) Storage resources required by the user are made available to the 
temporary user on the Windows machine. 5) At the close of the session, records of the session are kept, but 
the temporary username and credentials are destroyed. The virtual machine (now inaccessible with the 
destroyed credentials) is retained for a certain period, so that the state of the machine persists and can be 
accessed by the user — though using another set of temporary credentials created for the next session 
(DeLong 2016; diagram from Carter 2015). 
4. Duke Protected Network as an infrastructure “platform” 
While most research projects using the Protected Network require little more than a 
secure place for data storage and for computational analysis, some projects and university 
organizations have used the Protected Network as a platform upon which to build research 
infrastructures that shape and augment resources to fit specific purposes – in effect extending 
and creating a unique application of the combined features of the Protected Network. The 
Protected Network infrastructure makes it possible to develop new services that fit certain 
research activities that use sensitive information. This feature particularly expresses Duke’s 
over-arching philosophy of devising research IT around research intentions and processes (of 
course mindful of data classification), rather than the reverse: conforming research workflows 
and processes to a rigid and monolithic IT infrastructure. In effect, this general stance of 
research IT at Duke allows for innovative IT infrastructure to become a true research product 
complementing more conventional academic research products, such as publications, data 
sets, or software. 
We present three examples below, one from a major institute at Duke (4.1), another that 
is designed for a specific research project (4.2), and a third application that uses Protected 
Network features as a model for a similar environment designed for biomedical/clinical 
research (4.3). 
4.1. Special application: Protected Research Data Network (PRDN) 
The Protected Network is designed to simplify meeting computation and storage needs 
of university researchers and to turn many security requirements into technical controls. 
Meeting administrative requirements of data providers, campus and health system IRBs, 
information security offices, and the health system’s compliance office is often more nuanced 
and complicated. Mindful of the effort required for these administrative requirements, Duke’s 
Social Sciences Research Institute (SSRI, https://ssri.duke.edu/) supports social sciences 
researchers from a number of Duke academic departments and has created the Protected 
Research Data Network (PRDN) which is an isolated segment of the Duke Protected Network. 
The PRDN embodies a well balanced protected computing environment, since it uses 
technical controls available in the Protected Network, calls upon the talents of SSRI’s IT 
personnel, and links these with data security and compliance talents at the institute and the 
broader University in order to strengthen administrative controls for the environment to meet 
data providers’ requirements. In short, the PRDN emerges from a vital partnership of 
managed information technology, data security, and researchers. The SSRI PRDN was a 
logical extension of the development of the Protected Network, since it would have been 
inefficient, and perhaps impossible, to require all researchers on campus to use a specific 
research environment, without regard for the data they use and their methods and habits of 
analytical tools. The focus on social sciences research simplified early deployment and 
support of research, if for no other reason than the research activities bear a certain familial 
similarity. Currently, the diversity of researchers using the PRDN as a protected research data 
enclave has expanded beyond the social sciences to engineering, bioengineering, medical 
departments and projects involving export controlled data, among others. The SSRI PRDN 
team has managed data sets from over 75 different data providers, in support of 125+ 
different projects and 200+ individual researchers in the past three years. Administrative and 
technical controls implemented in the PRDN meet the requirements of most data providers so 
that little control customization is necessary from project to project. The technical and 
administrative controls are regularly evaluated against current requirements to ensure that the 
PRDN meets the majority of researchers’ protected data needs. Computation scales to very 
large RAM VMs and GPU VMs to support machine learning projects; PRDN storage capacity 
in 2017 has neared 100TB.  
The PRDN exploits some distinctions in the overall Protected Network environment in 
order to differentiate groups using the PRDN and supply them with different privileges over 
data sets with which they work. The PRDN has its own VPN context which is closely 
monitored by PRDN staff. Groups can be differentiated by which mode(s) of access they use. 
While members of research groups can only use data to which they are explicitly granted 
access, actions they can take with data depend on whether they are authorized to use the 
VPN or not. If they are not authorized for VPN usage, they are limited to using Remote 
Desktop Protocol (RDP) provided through a central Terminal Services “jumpbox.” RDP users 
cannot remove data from the PRDN, and “copy-and-paste” features in the environment have 
been deactivated. Data stewards – usually the data managers or faculty PIs – can use the 
VPN context, using an endpoint that is managed by Duke IT staff to meet university 
information security standards for sensitive data. Thus, by exploiting the distinction between 
VPN and RDP technologies, the PRDN has created a “technical control” on data access  
enforced by careful administrative control over group memberships – that is, over who is 
permitted to use VPN and who uses RDP. 
In addition to the creative 
implementation of VPN and RDP 
controls, other standards are 
implemented as well, such as a 
consistent set of software on all 
VMs using Duke-provided central 
repositories that have been 
customized for the PRDN. Reports 
are created for compliance and to 
alert researchers of resource 
efficiencies or deficiencies on their 
respective systems. 
4.2. Special application: Research 
environment for synthetic data 
research 
The NSF-sponsored “CIF21 
DIBBs: An Integrated System for 
Public/Private Access to Large-
Scale, Confidential Social Science 
Data” (ACI-1443014) illustrates 
how the Protected Network could 
support the development of a 
specialized system and turn an IT 
innovation supporting a research project into a model and replicable research product. The 
project was conceived early on as being housed in the Protected Network, using SSRI’s 
PRDN, primarily because the nature of the data required significant protection and vigilance. 
Its data is from the US Government Office of Personnel Management (OPM) CPDF-EHRI 
(Barrientos, et al. 2017; Reiter 2017). Personnel from Duke’s OIT and SSRI were engaged 
very early as the PIs began framing the grant proposal. Since the award in 2014, IT staff have 
been directly engaged with the execution of the project. This close engagement of information 
technology staff with the research team has enabled an expansion and tailored provisioning 
of resources in the PRDN so that resources directly support the DIBBs research workflows. 
 
Figure 3: The integrated system. In order to provide a 
protected area for development of the system, all components 
are encapsulated in the Duke Protected Network / PRDN (BLUE 
box). In other environments where synthetic data is able to be 
made public without disclosure concerns, such a complete 
isolation would not be required. The original sensitive data is 
protected (RED box), and those data would always be tightly 
controlled. In the case of the DIBBs grant, this network area 
contained the OPM data and was not accessible by individuals 
who were granted access only to the synthetic data. Synthetic 
data modeled from the original data (ORANGE box) allows 
access in a less restricted fashion than is the case for the original 
data. Since the synthetic data resembles the original data in 
structure and general characteristics, analysis conducted with it 
can be useful and meaningful. Results from analysis of synthetic 
data can be compared with identical analysis conducted on the 
original data set (“verification service,” PURPLE hexagon). The 
service has access to both the highly protected original data and 
is accessible by individuals with access only to the synthetic data. 
Such tailoring and easy adaptation to requirements are made simpler by the virtualization 
scheme that underlies provisioning resources in the Protected Network. For example, in 
summer 2017, an instance of Apache 
Spark (http://spark.apache.org/) was 
positioned for the DIBBs project in 
order to pilot its use for fast lookups 
and distributed processing of large 
scale data. During earlier stages of 
the project, such SQL databasing and 
statistical analysis was handled by a 
stand-alone server in the Protected 
Network, and scaling the database 
resource to meet greater demand and 
more complex analysis was 
challenging. The applicability of 
Apache Spark to the project was not 
foreseen at the onset of the project, 
and flexibility of virtualized resources 
in the Protected Network allowed a 
“mid-course correction” to take 
advantage of the emerging 
technology. With virtualization, new 
and developing technologies like 
Spark can be provisioned into the 
Protected Network very economically, 
so that the technology can be easily 
scaled up and tested. 
The infrastructure that the 
DIBBs project has developed uses 
the Protected Network environment 
as a protected space to design and 
implement an innovative research 
 
Figure 4: Workflows. Researchers gain access to the data and 
either choose to access the synthetic data or the original data (if 
they have been granted access to use the original data). If 
access is not granted (or has been revoked) to either data set, 
the process stops (A). Researchers can choose to do analysis 
and use results; researchers using the synthetic data can choose 
(B) to use the verification service to compare results. If they 
choose to do so, the query and the results are captured and 
passed to the verification service. Anticipated new features tie in 
evaluation of results in light of a statistical budget. When this 
addition is in place, the service determines whether or not the 
query has been subjected to verification before (C). If so, the 
results of that comparison are returned and no Epsilon expense 
is registered. If not, the process of comparison continues. The 
Epsilon value of the query is checked against the statistical 
budget (D). If the budget has been exceeded, the workflow stops 
and no results are returned; if not, the report is packaged, the 
Epsilon value is deducted from the statistical budget, and results 
of the verification are returned. 
computing environment where data can be exposed to researchers in a manner that is less or 
more restrictive according to the sensitivity of the data sets and the privileges granted to the 
researcher. The research group has created “synthetic data” from the original and very 
sensitive OPM data, and the synthetic data can more readily be made available to 
researchers, who can get meaningful information from it without disclosing personally 
identifiable information of federal government employees (Barrientos, et al. 2017). Moreover, 
the underlying IT infrastructure makes verification of results derived from synthetic data 
possible as well, since results from the synthetic data analysis can be compared with results 
from the “real” data – done in a manner that is controlled and that records and manages 
differential privacy measures. 
Figure 3 schematically represents the way that computational and data resources are 
isolated and linked via a “verification server” that compares results from analysis executed on 
the synthetic (less sensitive) and the “real” (more sensitive) data (Reiter, Oganian, & Karr 
2009). Comparisons are relayed back to the researcher without revealing original sensitive 
data, though the system also takes into account differential privacy measures and can abide 
by an “analysis budget” to limit information about the original data that may be leaked by 
computed comparisons of real and synthetic data. Figure 4 illustrates typical workflows that 
researchers use in the integrated system, including planned, but not yet implemented, 
provisions for enforcement of a statistical budget. 
The entire integrated system allows research conducted on synthetic data to be 
confidently considered valid of the original data as well, meaning that researchers can make 
conclusions about the original sensitive data – in this case OPM data – without requiring 
direct access to that very sensitive data. In practical terms, the system will encourage 
explorations of less sensitive data, leading to more targeted and efficient interrogation of the 
original data with less risk of disclosure. 
4.3. Special application: Outfitting a protected environment for medical research 
Protected Health Information originating from the Duke Health System is an important 
resource for biomedical and institutional research, but it is also highly sensitive and subject to 
regulations from HIPAA and HITECH. In order maintain compliance with the regulations, 
minimize risk to the health system, and exploit research opportunities that the data afford, 
Duke Health and University IT organizations have collaborated to develop a Duke Health 
System-based environment called PACE (“Protected Analysis Computing Environment”). In 
many ways, PACE shows a kinship with the Protected Network, though its implementation 
uses technologies that are more familiar to Duke Health Technology Solutions (DHTS) IT staff. 
Virtual machines with applications that are used for most clinical studies are “standard 
issue” in the environment, and because they are standardized, creation and maintenance is 
simplified. A greater challenge are resources that are needed for other complex and often “big 
data” projects that may require GPU processors, a large number of CPU-cores or large 
memory, or custom (and often experimental) software. Provisioning of these “exceptions” has 
led to an innovative automation design that includes containerization technology (Docker and 
Singularity), staged provisioning, and relocation of approved containers in the secure enclave. 
The systems comprise a tightly controlled variant of a typical “continuous delivery pipeline” 
that accommodates constraints of a protected network environment. 
Containers of machines are developed and vetted outside of PACE, where they are 
approved by researchers as usable for their sensitive project. Introduction of the approved 
containerized machine is done in a tightly controlled manner, involving an approval for 
inclusion into PACE and subsequent automated deployment into the environment. Because 
the containers comprise machine images, access to external software sources such as the 
Comprehensive R Archive Network (CRAN; https://cran.r-project.org/) from within PACE is 
not required. Updating of machines within the environment essentially means updating 
externally and then using the continuous delivery pipeline to deploy inside of PACE. 
All containerized software in the PACE environment interacts only with data resources 
provided by Duke Health-maintained storage devices, and research using sensitive data is 
conducted with the virtual machines only within PACE. Research results can be removed 
from PACE through an “honest broker” – an administrative process that applies regulations 
and data use agreements to the specific data that researchers wish to move outside the 
environment. 
Although PACE is separated (unlike the PRDN) from the Protected Network, the 
technologies and principles that are in use and in effect in the Protected Network have been 
reapplied. Indeed, PACE, the Protected Network, and the PRDN are very complementary. 
Prototypes of the continuous integration pipeline that is essential to deployment of PACE VMs 
were developed and tested in the Protected Network and PRDN. As the PACE environment 
develops, we expect that lessons learned will inform the further development of the Protected 
Network.  
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